The Ideological Matrix of Science: Natural Selection and Immunity as Case Studies by Ostachuk, Agustin
Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 1, 2019 
www.cosmosandhistory.org  182 
 
 
THE IDEOLOGICAL MATRIX OF SCIENCE: 
NATURAL SELECTION AND IMMUNITY AS CASE 
STUDIES 
Agustin Ostachuk 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The modern concept of ideology was established by the liberal politician and 
philosopher Destutt de Tracy, with the objective of creating an all-embracing and general 
science of ideas, which followed the sensualist and empiricist trend initiated by Locke. He also 
built his political economy upon the liberal concepts from Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus. 
The Malthusian concept of struggle for existence wrongly assumed that population grew faster 
than the means of existence. This “natural” law contained implicitly the idea that the poor and 
least gifted would not survive. This idea led to the progressive development of the concept of 
natural selection, whose definitive version was given by Darwin. Mechnikov took both these 
concepts and conceived immunity as a struggle between a host and its invader, the so-called 
phagocytosis theory. This theory created the necessity to possess mechanisms to discriminate 
between the own and the foreign, and led to the conception of the immune self. These concepts 
were not developed from ideas coming from perceptions or sensations, but from ideas coming 
from their values: individual interest, inevitable inequality, property, utility and profit. Values 
are ideals that constitute an ideological matrix that exerts a numinous activity and inspire us 
and impulse us towards certain directions. 
KEYWORDS: Ideology; Natural selection; Immunity; Self; Values; Ideological matrix  
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IDEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE OF IDEAS 
Ideologists, ideologues or both? 
Ideology has currently a negative and pejorative connotation, especially in 
science. It is placed next to vice, bad habit and moral corruption, and as such, 
being incompatible with a pure and aseptic activity as science. However, and as 
weird and ironic it could sound today, in its origin Ideology was intended to be 
a strictly scientific discipline. The negative connotation that the term acquired 
was a result of its application and usage in the French political arena, during 
the times of Napoleon Bonaparte.  
The “ideologists” [idéologues] were an intellectual group composed of many 
renowned and celebrated scientists. This group consisted of many members of 
the Institut de France, founded in 1795, such as Antoine Destutt de Tracy 
(philosopher), Pierre Cabanis (physician), Constantin-François de Chassebœuf 
(Volney, historian), Jean-Baptiste Say (economist), among others. They were 
the forerunners of positivism, a philosophical theory and worldview that it was 
going to be synthetized by Auguste Comte in the 1830s.  
Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) published from 1801 to 1815 his work 
entitled Eléments d'Idéologie, where he tried to develop a “science of ideas”. 
Destutt de Tracy's major philosophical influences were John Locke (1632-1704) 
and Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (1714-1780), so he attached himself to an 
empiricist tradition which can be traced up to Francis Bacon (1561-1626). The 
point of departure of Destutt de Tracy was the debunking and overthrow of 
metaphysics as “first philosophy” and its replacement by logics. The science of 
human understanding should not be “a hypothetical science”, nor a science 
“based on frivolous assumptions”, but a science that started “from a well-
certified and well-proven fact; the perceptions of our sensitivity, that is, our 
sensations”, because they were “the source and origin of all our ideas” (Destutt 
de Tracy 1796, p. 289). The underlying hypothesis was the sensualist 
conviction, adopted from Locke and Condillac, that sensory perceptions were 
the only source of our ideas. 
In this context, Destutt de Tracy proposed the creation of a new science 
which he called Ideology. He considered Ideology as a natural science (a part of 
Zoology) and devoted to study the means of knowing and teach us to judge and 
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reason. The first sketch of this new science was presented and published as an 
article in Mémoires de l'Institut National des Sciences et Arts: Sciences Morales et 
Politiques, in 1796: “I would much prefer, then, to adopt the term ideology, or 
science of ideas. It is very appropriate, for it supposes nothing doubtful or 
unknown; it does not remind us of any idea of cause. Its meaning is very clear 
to everybody [...] for everyone knows what it is meant by an idea” (Destutt de 
Tracy 1796, p. 324). The basic element of this system was the idea. Ideas were 
the elements and forms of perception, therefore, they were the basic elements 
of knowledge: “our perceptions or our ideas (I will always make these two 
words absolutely synonymous) are the things that we feel” (Destutt de Tracy 
1817a, p. 25). In this manner, ideas were received directly from the senses, that 
is, sensations were themselves ideas. Consequently, “thinking [was] feeling” 
(Destutt de Tracy 1817a, p. 25) and to think was simply to have perceptions. 
Sensitivity, memory, judgment and will, were all different kinds of feeling: the 
faculty of feeling sensations, the faculty of feeling recollections, the faculty of 
feeling relations/connections, and the faculty of feeling desires, respectively. 
On the other hand, complex ideas were built from combinations, relations and 
connections among simple ideas. In consequence, the modern usage of the 
term ideology was born as an empiricist science of ideas rooted in the sensualist 
theories of Locke and Condillac. 
In his ascending career with successful military campaigns, Napoleon 
sought the support of the ideologists and he became a member of the Institut in 
1797. The ideologists first supported Napoleon and they promoted his accession 
to power in 1799, when he organized a coup and became First Consul of the 
Republic (Lichtheim 1964). Many members of the group (including Destutt de 
Tracy) were elected by Napoleon as senators of the new government. As 
Napoleon's power increased and concentrated, the relation between them 
deteriorated drastically and turned hostile. The first discord was Napoleon's 
reconciliation with the Catholic Church, the Concordat of 1801, which was 
opposed to the secular views of the ideologists, and the ideas from the 
Revolution which they defended. Afterwards, in 1803, Napoleon dissolved the 
“Second Class” of the Institut, the section devoted to Moral and Political 
Sciences (and the one to which Destutt de Tracy belonged as associate 
member). Napoleon saw ideologists' political and economic liberalism as a 
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threat to his protectionist economy and centralist politics. Consequently, he 
condemned ideology as “shadowy metaphysics” and the ideologists as 
“disguised materialists” (Kennedy 1979), and the use of the term “ideology” 
with a pejorative and derogatory connotation began. The ideologists were 
denounced as ideologues against the Republic. These allegations were not 
unfounded, the ideologists participated in the Malet conspiracies and coup 
attempts of 1808 and 1812. 
The ideologists, therefore, were not mere scientists, they were also 
accomplished politicians and participated actively in the political scene of their 
time. In spite of the apparent neutrality and empirism in his scientific 
approach, Destutt de Tracy's refoundational work on ideology was not 
intended to be only a treatise on logics and linguistics. The fourth and fifth 
parts, published as the fourth volume of the series, was entitled Traité de la volonté 
et des ses effets (1815) and versed on economics and moral1. Following his general 
approach, will arised from perception, and with will all the well-known ideas 
from liberal economy, almost with a necessity of a natural law. For example, 
the idea of property was the inevitable consequence of the existence of the idea 
of personality, which, in turn, derived necessarily from will. 
Economic ideas as natural laws 
There was an inevitable consequence of establishing, as the point of departure, 
ideas as complex relations of perceptions: “man alone makes exchanges” 
(Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. 14)2. Man was an animal of exchanges, a trading 
animal, and therefore “society [was] purely and solely a continual series of 
 
1 This volume was translated into English, edited by Thomas Jefferson, and published in 1817 with the title 
“A treatise on political economy” (Destutt de Tracy 1817b). This translation is used in this work for 
citation purposes. Citations were compared with the original version to check accuracy.  
2 He was intending to quote a phrase from Adam Smith, whose exact terms were the following: “This 
division of labour, from which so many advantages are derived, is not originally the effect of any human 
wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence to which it gives occasion. It is the necessary, 
though very slow and gradual consequence of a certain propensity in human nature which has in view no 
such extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another. Whether this 
propensity be one of those original principles in human nature of which no further account can be given; 
or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, 
it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race 
of animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of contracts” (Smith 1791, vol. 1, p. 19). 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 186 
exchanges” (Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. 6). With those premises and consequent 
deductions, it was also natural that wealth came from production3, and that 
value was to be defined as a measure of utility4. Now, if the means of 
production determined the means of existence, then the problem was 
distribution. And according to Destutt de Tracy, these means were insufficient 
and unequal distribution was inevitable as it was natural: “These resources, 
these riches, so insufficient for happiness, are also very unequally divided 
amongst us; and this is inevitable. We have seen that property exists in nature: for 
it is impossible that everyone should not be the proprietor of his individuality 
and of his faculties. The inequality in these is not less: for it is impossible that all 
individuals should be alike, and have the same degree of force, intelligence and 
happiness. This natural inequality is extended and manifested in proportion as 
our means are developed and diversified” (Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. 111). The 
last step of this apparently inevitable situation was provided by the work of 
Thomas Malthus: “M. Malthus goes much further still. He is, at least as far as I 
am acquainted, of all the authors who have written on population, the one who 
has treated the subject the most profoundly, and has developed all its 
consequences. His work, singularly remarkable, should be regarded as the last 
state of science on this important object, and he leaves almost nothing to be 
desired. M. Malthus does not limit himself to prove, that though population is 
arrested at different degrees in different countries, and according to different 
circumstances, it is always and everywhere as great as it can be, having regard 
to the means of existence. He shows that always in civilised nations it is too 
great for the happiness of man; because that men, and above all the poor, who 
everywhere constitute the great number, urged by the stimulus so imperious to 
reproduction, always multiply imprudently and without foresight; and plunge 
themselves into inevitable misery by a multiplication of the men, who demand 
occupation, and to whom none can be given” (Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. 128). 
Therefore, inequality was a consequence of differential physical and mental 
capacity, and the increase of the means of production intensified that inherent 
 
3 “To be rich is to possess these goods; to be poor is to be without them” (Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. XIII). 
4 “Utility [...] constitutes the value of whatsoever we call our riches” (Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. 25). 
Destutt de Tracy recognized labour as accounting for the value of a product, but ultimately for him to 
produce “is to give things an utility which they had not. Whatever be our labour, if no utility results from 
it it is unfruitful. If any results it is productive” (Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. 20). 
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inequality. Moreover, population tended to grow beyond its means of 
existence, and misery inevitably increased among the poor. 
Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) had proposed a few years earlier (1798) that, as 
population increased faster (in geometrical ratio) than the means of existence 
(arithmetical ratio), a series of checks on populations existed which secured a 
certain balance between them5. These checks were numerous, but all “may be 
fairly resolved into misery and vice” (Malthus 1798, p. 100). The positive checks 
to population, that is, “the check that represses an increase which is already 
begun” (Malthus 1798, p. 71), did not exert their action evenly in all social 
strata: “the misery that checks population falls chiefly, as it always must do, 
upon that part whose condition is lowest in the scale of society” (Malthus 1798, 
p. 41). For Malthus, misery was an inevitable law of nature and, therefore, it 
could never be eradicated or eliminated: “Is it not a degree of misery, the 
necessary and inevitable result of the laws of nature, which human institutions, 
so far from aggravating, have tended considerably to mitigate, though they 
never can remove” (Malthus 1798, p. 194). As “to prevent the recurrence of 
misery, is, alas! beyond the power of man. In the vain endeavour to attain what 
in the nature of things is impossible” (Malthus 1798, p. 98), Malthus was a 
fervent proponent of the elimination of the Poor-Laws, created to ameliorate 
the economic situation of the lower classes of the society. He believed that 
cooperation was prejudicial and every man should stand for himself. His 
solution for improving the condition of the poor was that they assume their 
own duties: “The happiness of the whole is to be the result of the happiness of 
individuals, and to begin first with them. No cooperation is required. Every 
step tells. He who performs his duty faithfully will reap the full fruits of it, 
whatever may be the number of others who fail. This duty is intelligible to the 
humblest capacity. It is merely, that he is not to bring beings into the world, for 
whom he cannot find the means of support. When once this subject is cleared 
from the obscurity thrown over it by parochial laws and private benevolence, 
every man must feel the strongest conviction of such an obligation. If he cannot 
support his children, they must starve; and if he marry in the face of a fair 
 
5 Malthus' essay from 1798 was a response, as the full title indicated, to Godwin and Condorcet's belief in 
the indefinite progress of humanity. His principle of population was a concept devised to set a limit to that 
progress, establishing a natural context of scarcity. 
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probability that he shall not be able to support his children, he is guilty of all 
the evils, which he thus brings upon himself, his wife and his offspring” 
(Malthus 1826, vol. 2, p. 285). 
NATURAL SELECTION OR THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE IN 
NATURE 
Darwin's education and the voyage in the Beagle 
The HMS Beagle sailed for its second voyage on December 27, 1831. The main 
purpose of this second expedition was to carry out hydrographic surveys at the 
coasts of South America, starting at the Río de la Plata down to Tierra del 
Fuego, ascending the west coast as north as possible and returning through the 
Pacific Ocean circumnavigating the Earth. Its captain, Robert FitzRoy, 
considered for this new voyage the necessity to count with a geologist on board. 
By John Henslow's recommendation6, the job was given to a young 
inexperienced naturalist who had recently graduated from university, Charles 
Darwin. 
Charles Darwin, born in 1809, had begun studying medicine at the 
University of Edinburgh (1825-1827) at his father's indication, but he left and 
later enrolled at Christ's College, University of Cambridge, for a Bachelor of 
Arts degree (1828-1831), with the apparent idea of finally becoming an Anglican 
parson. At Edinburgh, Darwin became a student of Robert Grant7, a marine 
invertebrate zoologist. Grant was a friend and an advocator of the theories of 
Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, while both were supporters of the theory of 
inheritance of acquired characteristics advanced by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, a 
colleague of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire at the Muséum National d'Histoire 
Naturelle, since its creation in 1793. At Cambridge, Darwin became a student 
of John Henslow, a professor of botany, geologist and priest. During his years 
of study at Cambridge, Darwin became very acquainted with the works of 
William Paley, and expressed his admiration for Paley's logic and style in 
 
6 Charles Darwin was not the first choice. Henslow had offered the job to Leonard Jenyns first, a parson-
naturalist, but he declined the offer due to commitments to his parish.  
7 The relation of Darwin with Grant was plague of conflicts in which Grant gave credit for himself of 
Darwin's discoveries. 
 AGUSTIN OSTACHUK 189 
various occasions. Paley had explained the perfect and complex adaptation of 
organisms to their environments as evidence of a rational and intelligent pre-
design. 
With this intellectual background, Darwin began his journey to South 
America on board of the Beagle, accompanied by Charles Lyell's “Principles of 
Geology” (first volume). Lyell was opposed to the transmutation of species and 
followed mainly the ideas of Cuvier regarding the existence of types that could 
vary slightly. In chapter 9 of the aforementioned book, Lyell discussed “the 
theory of the progressive development of organic life” from “the simplest to the 
most complicated forms”. 
On 26 July 1832, after landing in Bahia and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), the 
Beagle reached Montevideo (Uruguay). From this strategic point, Darwin made 
various expeditions into Argentinean territories: Buenos Aires, Bahía Blanca, 
Punta Alta, Carmen de Patagones, ascended the Paraná River up to Santa Fe, 
and reached the southern territories of Puerto Deseado, Puerto San Julián, 
Tierra del Fuego and Islas Malvinas. At Punta Alta, Darwin found numerous 
fossils of large extinct mammals, such as the posteriorly described by Richard 
Owen Megatherium, Mylodon and Scelidotherium (Darwin 1839, p. 95). By 
November Darwin received by mail the second volume of Lyell's “Principles of 
Geology”. In this second volume, Lyell criticized Lamarck's “theory of 
transmutation of species”. In the first chapter, he endeavored to discredit 
Lamarck's two principles of (1) “tendency to progressive development” and (2) 
“force of external circumstances” (Lyell 1832, p. 13-14). According to Lamarck, 
there was an internal force in nature that generated a progressive 
complexification of organization, evidenced as a scale of beings from the 
simplest to the most complex. This continuous scale of progressive complex 
organization was affected and interrupted by the external influence of the 
environment. Environmental changes generated different needs in organisms, 
these needs generated new habits, and these new habits produced organic 
modifications which were transmitted to the descendants. This second principle 
was commonly known as the “inheritance of acquired characteristics”. 
The development of the concept of natural selection and the dispute over the Malthusian influence 
On 2 October 1836, the Beagle finally arrived back to England. Since his arrival, 
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Darwin dedicated himself to write a manuscript with his observations as he was 
offered the opportunity to contribute with the natural history section to the 
captain's account of the voyage. He completed the manuscript by August - 
September 1837, and the text was finally published in 1839 as the third volume 
of the series. 
During that time lapse, many things happened and many conceptual 
transformations occurred. Darwin began to write his notebooks on 
“transmutation of species” in mid-1837. In the third notebook, in his entrance 
of 28 September 1838, he recorded his reading of Malthus' “An essay on the 
principle of population”. Much was debated regarding the contribution and 
importance of this reading for Darwin's development of the concept of natural 
selection, especially around the beginning of the 1970s (Vorzimmer 1969; 
Young 1969; Herbert 1971; Gale 1972). The accent and axis of the debate was 
put on “how much” Darwin did actually need Malthus for his conceptual 
development. This approach based on the “influence” was a strategy that 
presupposed and tended to the relativization of the relationship. A more 
conceptual and structural study is demanded to comprehend this matter. 
One thing generally assumed was that Darwin took knowledge of Malthus' 
essay content only in 1838, and not before that date. This date was used as a 
reference point that enabled to establish and reconstruct what Darwin knew 
and developed before and after his reading of Malthus. For example, Gavin de 
Beer concluded that Darwin developed the concept of natural selection before 
this reading and Malthus provided Darwin only with the appropriate context 
for its application: “From the list of books read, appended to the Second 
Notebook, it is known that he did not read Malthus's Essay on Population 
before 3rd October 1838, from which it can be seen that the contents of the 
Third Notebook owe nothing to Malthus's work. It is therefore of great 
importance to note that Darwin hit on the principle of natural selection 
independently. After a consideration of changes resulting in the formation of 
new species, he wrote: "All this agrees well with my view of those forms slightly 
favoured getting the upper hand and forming species" (III 175)” (Darwin 1969, 
p. 121). Therefore, Malthus' essay “supplied him with the remaining piece that 
he required to complete the construction of his argument” (Darwin 1969, p. 
26). This strategy of reconstruction of Darwin's theory by pieces, as a jigsaw 
puzzle, was further developed by Vorzimmer. His conclusion was that “without 
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doubt […] the great watershed in the development of Darwin's evolutionary 
theory came with his reading of Malthus. Not only did Malthus provide a vital 
missing element, but it served to precipitate other, equally necessary, elements 
into their proper place in Darwin's thought” (Vorzimmer 1969). He considered 
that Darwin was aware of the existence of a natural counterpart to artificial 
selection and that the concept of struggle for existence enabled him to apply 
this process in nature. In consequence, despite their difference in tone, 
Vorzimmer's conclusion was similar to de Beer's. Both assumed that Malthus 
provided a missing link to Darwin's theory, a piece that allowed arranging the 
rest in a coherent picture, and that he knew how to apply this piece only after 
his reading of Malthus in September 1838. In this manner, they placed 
Malthusian ideas in Darwin's theory as a rather confirmatory role and nearly a 
posteriori contribution.  
Against this argument, Young (1969) warned about the fact that Malthus' 
“influence” was “pervasive in the biological literature of the first decades of the 
century”. Even de Beer recognized that the concept of “struggle for existence 
was well known to Darwin” from the work, for example, of Lyell (Darwin 1969, 
p. 40). One could read in his “Principles of Geology”8: “In the universal struggle 
for existence, the right of the strongest eventually prevails; and the strength and 
durability of a race depends mainly on its prolificness, in which hybrids are 
acknowledged to be deficient” (Lyell 1832, p. 56). As can be seen, Darwin 
would not only have received the concept of struggle for existence from Lyell, 
but also the concept of selectionism in nature. In fact, other people before 
Darwin had developed the concept of natural selection. Again, de Beer 
acknowledged this, but with reservations: “two contemporaries [Charles Lyell 
and Edward Blyth] recognized natural selection but used it to prove that 
evolution could not occur. Unknown to Darwin, two other men [William Wells 
and Patrick Matthew] had, before him, grasped the solution of the problem 
and stated that natural selection could cause modification of species; but they 
were very far from being able to appreciate the significance of what they had 
done, provide evidence to support it, or work out its consequences” (Darwin 
 
8 As stated before, this second volume was received and read by Darwin the same year of its publication in 
1832. 
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1969, p. 27). 
Thomas Huxley also recognized that there were earlier antecedents of the 
concept of natural selection, such as those from William Wells and Patrick 
Matthew. For example, Wells affirmed: “those who attend to the improvement 
of domestic animals, when they find individuals possessing, in a greater degree 
than common, the qualities they desire, couple a male and female of these 
together, then take the best of their offspring as a new stock, and in this way 
proceed, till they approach as near the point in view, as the nature of things will 
permit. But, what is here done by art, seems to be done, with equal efficacy, 
though more slowly, by nature, in the formation of varieties of mankind, fitted 
for the country which they inhabit” (Wells 1818, p. 435). In later editions of the 
Origin, Darwin credited Wells for the recognition of the principle of natural 
selection. However, it was not a full credit but a partial and circumscribed 
recognition, as Darwin considered that “he applie[d] it only to man, and to 
certain characters alone” (Darwin 1866, p. XIV). 
One fact that has been overlooked up to now in this conceptual puzzle is 
that Darwin would not have needed to read Malthus' book in order to obtain 
the “missing link” or “ordering piece” for the development of his theory. This 
fact is that Darwin had already read Malthus' theory of population during his 
years of study at university, more precisely, immediately after having graduated 
at Cambridge in 1831. The thing is that Paley in his “Natural Theology” (1802) 
expounded and discussed Malthus' theory: “The order of generation proceeds 
by something like a geometrical progression. The increase of provision, under 
circumstances even the most advantageous, can only assume the form of an 
arithmetic series. Whence it follows, that the population will always overtake 
the provision, will pass beyond the line of plenty, and will continue to encrease 
till checked by the difficulty of procuring subsistence9” (Paley 1802, p. 372)10. 
In consequence, Darwin had no priority over the concepts of transmutation 
of species and natural selection. Possibly, he could be credited for having 
 
9 At this point Paley introduced a footnote that said: “See this subject stated in a late Treatise upon 
Population” (Paley 1802, p. 372), which was, in spite of its vagueness, a clear reference to Malthus' “An 
essay on the principle of population” (1798). 
10 As far as I am concerned, this fact was not detected and exposed in the previous literature analyzing 
Malthus' influence on Darwin's theory. 
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combined both. However, the purpose of this article is not to establish to whom 
these priorities corresponded, and who was the real precursor and father of 
these concepts. The purpose is to analyze where these concepts came from and 
how they developed. We have seen that natural selection, whenever it 
appeared, was always accompanied by the corresponding Malthusian concept 
of struggle for existence. Therefore, one fundamental question we should ask 
for is: could the concept of natural selection have been developed without the 
corresponding Malthusian concept? Could one exist without the other? 
Blyth and the creative power of natural selection 
It seemed that Darwin was not aware of the previous works of Wells (1818) and 
Mathews (1831). However, the same argument could not be applied to Blyth. 
Darwin cited him various times in his notebooks on the transmutation of 
species. One could read in a paper published by Blyth in 1835: “the original 
and typical form of an animal is in great measure kept up by the same identical 
means by which a true breed is produced11. The original form of a species is 
unquestionably better adapted to its natural habits than any modification of that 
form; and, as the sexual passions excite to rivalry and conflict, and the stronger 
must always prevail over the weaker, the latter, in a state of nature, is allowed but few 
opportunities of continuing its race. In a large herd of cattle, the strongest bull 
drives from him all the younger and weaker individuals of his own sex, and 
remains sole master of the herd; so that all the young which are produced must 
have had their origin from one which possessed the maximum of power and 
physical strength; and which, consequently, in the struggle for existence, was the 
best able to maintain his ground, and defend himself from every enemy. In like 
manner, among animals which procure their food by means of their agility, 
strength, or delicacy of sense, the one best organized must always obtain the greatest 
quantity; and must, therefore, become physically the strongest, and be thus enabled, by routing 
 
11 This mechanism had been explained earlier in that text: “When two animals are matched together, 
each remarkable for a certain given peculiarity, no matter how trivial, there is also a decided tendency in 
nature for that peculiarity to increase; and if the produce of these animals be set apart, and only those in 
which the same peculiarity is most apparent, be selected to breed from, the next generation will possess it in 
a still more remarkable degree; and so on, till at length the variety I designate a breed, is formed, which may 
be very unlike the original type” (Blyth 1835, p. 45). 
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its opponents, to transmit its superior qualities to a greater number of  offspring. The same 
law, therefore, which was intended by Providence to keep up the typical 
qualities of a species, can be easily converted by man into a means of raising 
different varieties” (Blyth 1835, p. 46). The concept of natural selection is 
clearly established and explained by Blyth in this excerpt. It is also suggestive 
that Blyth used exact Malthusian terminology for his explanation (i.e. struggle for 
existence). 
Gavin de Beer assumed that “like Lyell before him, Blyth who believed in 
special creation used the principle of natural selection to prove that species 
were immutable” (Darwin 1969, p. 36). This asseveration was rather hasty and 
in need of further consideration and analysis. Lyell was against a possible 
transmutation of species as this was necessary for supporting and being logically 
coherent with his theory of uniformitarianism (Darwin 1969, p. 33). Both 
considered that some degree of organic modification on species, although 
restricted and limited, was possible, they considered them as varieties and, as 
such, as deviations from a prototype or original type. Blyth clearly established 
the principle of natural selection, its proper functioning and application, 
although he did not give a specific term for it. Now, at first glance, there 
seemed to be some logical inconsistency in his argument. Blyth thought that 
this was the law used by nature to keep up the species (Blyth 1835, p. 46). Then, 
it seemed that he used the same principle or law for explaining how species 
deviated from their original type and for explaining how they were maintained. 
However, the inconsistency is only apparent. Blyth considered that species 
could be artificially modified by the same principle acting in nature, but as “the 
original form of a species is unquestionably better adapted to its natural habits than 
any modification of that form”, artificial selection was as an unstable process 
that was always “reversed” by the principle of natural selection, if for example 
a domesticated animal was put again into its natural habitat. It is in this sense 
that we could assert that Blyth's principle was conservative. But this was not all, 
as his principle was conservative for another reason. Actually, Blyth believed 
that such a principle was not a creative factor. In other words, he believed that 
this process had not a modifying effect. Eiseley (1959) remarked that Blyth “saw 
natural selection as pruning out the least deviation which threatened to unfit 
the animal for its environment”. Therefore, natural selection acted as a filter 
that eliminated the least fitted variants. For Eiseley, this restriction was a 
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limitation in Blyth's thinking and “it was Darwin's contribution, of course, that 
he altered the struggle for existence and made of it a creative mechanism” 
(Eiseley 1959). This question requires a further and deeper analysis. 
I agree with Eiseley in that Blyth saw natural selection as a filtering, 
discarding and eliminative process and that Darwin pretended to adjudicate 
and endow it with a creative and modifying power. However, contrary to 
Eiseley's assumption that Darwin's contribution implied a clear step forward 
with respect to Blyth's version, I consider Darwin's pretension ambiguous and 
problematic. Along the Origin of  species, Darwin continuously and alternatively 
adjudicated to natural selection a preserving or a modifying activity12. Even in 
 
12 For example: “I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the 
term of Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man’s power of selection” (Darwin 1859, p. 61), 
“this preservation of favourable variations and the rejection of injurious variations, I call Natural Selection” 
(Darwin 1859, p. 81), “for natural selection to fill up by modifying and improving some of the varying 
inhabitants” (Darwin 1859, p. 82), “it may be said that natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinising, 
throughout the world, every variation, even the slightest; rejecting that which is bad, preserving and adding 
up all that is good; silently and insensibly working, whenever and wherever opportunity offers, at the 
improvement of each organic being” (Darwin 1859, p. 84), “natural selection will be enabled to act on and 
modify organic beings at any age, by the accumulation of profitable variations” (Darwin 1859, p. 86), 
“natural selection may modify and adapt the larva of an insect to a score of contingencies” (Darwin 1859, p. 
86), “natural selection will modify the structure of the young in relation to the parent, and of the parent in 
relation to the young” (Darwin 1859, p. 86), “a structure used only once in an animal's whole life, if of 
high importance to it, might be modified to any extent by natural selection” (Darwin 1859, p. 87), “natural 
selection can act only by the preservation and accumulation of infinitesimally small inherited modifications, 
each profitable to the preserved being” (Darwin 1859, p. 95), “natural selection will always tend to preserve 
all the individuals varying in the right direction” (Darwin 1859, p. 102), “natural selection be modifying  and 
improving a species in the several districts” (Darwin 1859, p. 102), “natural selection always tending to modify 
all the individuals in each district in exactly the same manner to the conditions of each” (Darwin 1859, p. 
103), “natural selection acts solely through the preservation of variations in some way advantageous, which 
consequently endure” (Darwin 1859, p. 109), “new species in the course of time are formed through natural 
selection” (Darwin 1859, p. 110), “natural selection acts through one form having some advantage over 
other forms in the struggle for existence, it will chiefly act on those which already have some advantage” 
(Darwin 1859, p. 125), “this principle of preservation, I have called, for the sake of brevity, Natural Selection. 
Natural selection, on the principle of qualities being inherited at corresponding ages, can modify the egg, 
seed, or young, as easily as the adult” (Darwin 1859, p. 127), “natural selection seems to have struggled 
with the loss of light and to have increased the size of the eyes” (Darwin 1859, p. 137), “natural selection will 
often have effected other changes” (Darwin 1859, p. 138), “natural selection will continually tend to preserve 
those individuals which are born with constitutions best  adapted to their native countries” (Darwin 1859, 
p. 142), “an ancient progenitor may have acquired through natural selection some one modification in 
structure” (Darwin 1859, p. 146), “natural selection may perfectly well succeed in largely developing any 
organ” (Darwin 1859, p. 148), “natural selection should have preserved or rejected each little deviation of 
form” (Darwin 1859, p. 149), “natural selection acts solely by the preservation of profitable modifications” 
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the title of his work this ambiguity remained: “On the origin of species by means 
of natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the struggle for life”, 
trying to equalize the generation of new species to their preservation. What it is 
problematic about this equalization is that selection is an a posteriori process. 
Selection can only be exerted on what is already generated. Darwin himself 
made this point very clear on numerous times: “unless profitable variations do 
occur, natural selection can do nothing” (Darwin 1859, p. 82). Therefore, it 
cannot be concluded that “selection was the principle of change” (Darwin 1903, 
vol. 1, p. 118). 
Another important point regarding this issue is if it is possible to conceive a 
natural counterpart to artificial selection. Young (1971) asked himself: “Does 
nature select?”. For Darwin, the answer was affirmative. In fact, his theoretical 
developments followed the line of this assumption, at least as he himself 
recognized in retrospective: “You are right, that I came to the conclusion that 
selection was the principle of change from the study of domesticated 
productions” (Darwin 1903, vol. 1, p. 118). From its conception, the principle of 
natural selection has been accused of personifying nature: selection required a 
selector, in this case nature itself. Darwin responded and defended against these 
accusations alleging that it was only a metaphor: “Several writers have 
misapprehended or objected to the term Natural Selection. Some have even 
 
(Darwin 1859, p. 172), “it would be easy for natural selection to fit the animal, by some modification of its 
structure, for its changed habits” (Darwin 1859, p. 183), “I can see no very great difficulty (not more than 
in the case of many other structures) in believing that natural selection has converted the simple apparatus of 
an optic nerve merely coated with pigment and invested by transparent membrane, into an optical 
instrument as perfect as is possessed by any member of the great Articulate class” (Darwin 1859, p. 188), 
“there seems to me to be no great difficulty in believing that natural selection has actually converted a 
swimbladder into a lung” (Darwin 1859, p. 191), “I do not doubt that little folds of skin […] have been 
gradually converted by natural  selection into branchiae” (Darwin 1859, p. 192), “natural selection acts by 
life and death, by the preservation of individuals with any favourable variation, and by the destruction of those 
with any unfavourable deviation of structure” (Darwin 1859, p. 194), “we may infer that these several 
bones might have been acquired through natural selection” (Darwin 1859, p. 200),  “natural selection can 
and does often produce structures for the direct injury of other species” (Darwin 1859, p. 200), “natural 
selection acts only by the accumulation of slight modifications of structure or instinct” (Darwin 1859, p. 233), 
“the theory of natural selection is grounded on the belief that each new variety, and ultimately each new 
species, is produced and  maintained by having some advantage over those with which it comes into 
competition; and the consequent extinction of less-favoured forms almost inevitably follows” (Darwin 
1859, p. 320), “old forms having been supplanted by new and improved forms of life, produced by the laws 
of variation still acting round us, and preserved by Natural Selection” (Darwin 1859, p. 345). 
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imagined that natural selection induces variability, whereas it implies only the 
preservation of such variations as arise and are beneficial to the being under its 
conditions of life. No one objects to agriculturists speaking of the potent effects 
of man's selection; and in this case the individual differences given by nature, 
which man for some object selects, must of necessity first occur. Others have 
objected that the term selection implies conscious choice in the animals which 
become modified […] Everyone knows what is meant and is implied by such 
metaphorical expressions; and they are almost necessary for brevity. So again it is 
difficult to avoid personifying the word Nature; but I mean by Nature, only the 
aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence 
of events as ascertained by us. With a little familiarity such superficial 
objections will be forgotten” (Darwin 1871, p. 85)13. However, Darwin's 
justification is insufficient. The problem is not the term itself or if it is a 
metaphor or not, the problem is what it is implied, the attributes and 
characteristics conferred to that term or metaphor. One of the best 
characterizations given by Darwin to his principle was the following: “One may 
say there is a force like a hundred thousand wedges trying [to] force every kind 
of adapted structure into the gaps in the oeconomy of nature, or rather forming 
gaps by thrusting out weaker ones” (Darwin 1967, p. 163). In this 
characterization, natural selection appeared as a filtering device which activity 
consisted of discarding the structures that did not conform to its imposed 
conditions. This explanation contained a metaphor, i.e. nature acting as a filter, 
but this metaphor did not imply judgment or valuation. A filter does not judge 
or valuate. In any case, the filter's maker can prepare the filter so as to obtain a 
desired or expected product. Therefore, in a strict sense, a filter cannot select 
but only discard, “thrust out”, only the filter's maker can. If nature was 
considered as “only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws, 
and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us”, nature cannot select. 
In consequence, the conflict with the term “natural selection” is not its 
metaphorical content, but the concession and endowment of attributes and 
properties incompatible with the intended metaphor. 
 
13 In this excerpt from the 5th edition (1871) of the Origin of species, it can be detected the same ambivalence 
and ambiguity mentioned before, regarding the real activity of a process such as natural selection, i.e. 
preservation or modification, in this case favoring the first one. 
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The value judgments of natural selection 
Darwin, in spite of continuously acknowledging a preserving activity to natural 
selection, conferred it repeatedly with the capacity of making value judgments. 
For example, he asserted that “natural selection will never produce in a being 
anything injurious to itself, for natural selection acts solely by and for the good 
of each. No organ will be formed, as Paley has remarked, for the purpose of 
causing pain or for doing an injury to its possessor” (Darwin 1859, p. 201). 
Nature was then posited as the censor, the guarantor and securer that only the 
most deserving beings were going to be selected and survive. This scenario did 
not differ substantially from the one proposed by Malthus: “Nature, in the 
attainment of her great purposes, seems always to seize upon the weakest part. 
If this part be made strong by human skill, she seizes upon the next weakest 
part, and so on in succession; not like a capricious deity, with an intention to 
sport with our sufferings, and constantly to defeat our labours; but, like a kind, 
though sometimes severe instructor, with the intention of teaching us to make 
all parts strong, and to chase vice and misery from the earth. In avoiding one 
fault we are too apt to run into some other; but we always find Nature faithful 
to her great object, at every false step we commit, ready to admonish us of our 
errors, by the infliction of some physical or moral evil” (Malthus 1826, vol. 2, p. 
304). At this stage, it is where the hidden face of Darwin's proposal reveals itself, 
where its ideological matrix is unmasked and exposed. At bottom, Darwin's 
proposal was an ideology-loaded and value-driven theory: nature was the 
personification of the ideology and values of the author and the society where 
he lived, which was fully expressed in Malthus' Essay on population. 
Malthus' principle of population was a principle that secured that only the 
most valuable individuals were able to survive: “A horse or any other working 
animal is said to be strong only in proportion to the strength of his weakest 
part. If his legs be slender and feeble, the strength of his body will be but of 
little consequence; or if he wants power in his back and haunches, the strength 
which he may possess in his limbs can never be called fully into action. The 
same reasoning must be applied to the power of the earth to support living 
creatures” (Malthus 1826, vol. 1, p. 139)14. In this manner, the principle of 
 
14 Subsequently, he gave an example of this assertion: “The Tartar therefore provides only for the most 
valuable of his cattle during the winter, and leaves the rest to support themselves by the scanty herbage 
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population was exerted with severity against the lowest classes of society, 
whereas the higher classes were more prepared to face this oppressive natural 
law. For Malthus, this natural state was just and justified: “We have seen the 
fatal effects that would result to a society, if every man had a valid claim to an 
equal share of the produce of the earth. The members of a family which was 
grown too large for the original division of land appropriated to it, could not 
then demand a part of the surplus produce of others, as a debt of justice. It has 
appeared, that from the inevitable laws of our nature, some human beings must 
suffer from want. These are the unhappy persons who, in the great lottery of 
life, have drawn a blank” (Malthus 1789, p. 204). 
Therefore, the ultimate objective of this intellectual endeavor was to 
establish the values of liberal economy as natural laws. According to Destutt de 
Tracy, from feeling arised will, from will arised the ideas of personality and 
property, and with them the idea of the self: “The idea of property arises then 
solely from the faculty of will; and moreover it arises necessarily from it, for we 
cannot have an idea of self without having that of the property in all the 
faculties of self and in their effects. If it was not thus, if there was not amongst us 
a natural and necessary property, there never would have been a conventional 
or artificial property” (Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. XII). Will rendered us 
susceptible to the satisfaction of wants and needs, that is, to the possession of 
goods, and “to be rich is to possess these goods; to be poor is to be without them” 
(Destutt de Tracy 1817b, p. XIII), and this depended solely on the employment 
of our faculties. In this manner, social inequality was natural as it proceeded 
from our differential inborn faculties. If it was natural, it was inevitable, and in 
a world where resources were limited, the only possible outcome was 
competition, the struggle among individuals and the survival of the “fittest”.  
 
which they can pick up. This poor living, combined with the severe cold, naturally destroys a considerable 
part of them” (Malthus 1826, vol. 1, p. 140). There are numerous examples of this kind throughout his 
work. 
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IMMUNITY OR THE STRUGGLE WITHIN 
The birth of immunology: Mechnikov's introduction of Darwin's theory in pathology 
It is commonly held that the birth of the science of immunology was Edward 
Jenner's discovery of “variolisation” or “inoculation”, i.e. vaccination, in 1796. 
As Mechnikov himself recognized, this was a practice known from centuries 
coming from the East (China): “Variolisation or "inoculation" coming to 
Europe from the East, had come into extensive use when, at the end of the 18th 
century, the discovery was made that cow-pox, the varioliform disease of the 
Bovidae, produced in persons who milked cows suffering from this eruption an 
immunity against small-pox.. This idea, popular in origin, was known to 
breeders in England, France, Germany, and Holland; we have thus an 
indication that this knowledge must date from a fairly distant period. Jenner 
gave the question a scientific and experimental basis” (Metchnikoff 1905, p. 
455). Therefore, vaccination was practiced in China since the 11th century, and 
was a popular knowledge among breeders at the time Jenner underwent his 
experiments. In consequence, was vaccination a process coupled to the one 
described previously, that is, animal domestication, for the improvement of 
species and the production of desired characteristics? 
As a result of the previous account, Mechnikov believed that also immunity 
existed “from time immemorial” and that it should be of “as ancient date as 
[was] disease” (Metchnikoff 1905, p. 545). We are not sure about that, especially 
when one read the following immediately afterwards: “The most simple and 
the most primitive organisms have constantly to struggle for their existence; they 
give chase to living organisms in order to obtain food, and they defend 
themselves against other organisms in order that they may not become their 
prey. When the aggressor in this struggle is much smaller than its adversary the 
result is that the former introduces itself into the body of the latter and destroys 
it by means of infection” (Metchnikoff 1905, p. 545). In this context, Mechnikov 
introduced the concept of struggle for existence in infectious diseases, and with 
it a whole arsenal of military conceptology and vocabulary: “But infection also 
has its counter. The attacked organism defends itself against the little aggressor. It 
protects itself by interposing a resistant membrane, or it uses all the means at its 
disposal to destroy the invader. As a very large number of organisms, in order to 
obtain nourishment, are obliged to submit their food to digestion by various 
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chemical substances, they utilise these substances in the struggle against the 
infective agents” (Metchnikoff 1905, p. 545). The need of defending themselves 
from invasive microorganisms pointed to the existence of a potential arsenal of 
mechanisms that allow organisms to prevent their usurpation, and the birth of 
immunology as a new branch of natural science occurred.  
Mechnikov and his early critics to Darwin's theory 
The case of Ilya Mechnikov is paradigmatic. In his youth he was a critic of 
Darwin's theory, his principle of natural selection and the introduction of 
Malthus' doctrine in biology. However, in his adulthood, after being established 
in Paris, holding a place of honor at the Pasteur Institute and winning a Nobel 
Prize, he became an advocator of Darwin's theory (Todes 1989, p. 82). 
In 1876 Mechnikov wrote a paper entitled “Essay on questions about the 
Origin of Species” in which he analyzed Darwin's work and found various 
inconsistencies and contradictions. For example, Darwin justified the relative 
lack of new species among freshwater forms and lower organisms by their 
geographical isolation from potential competitors. According to Mechnikov, 
this circumstance, on the contrary should be ideal for the production of new 
species: “here Malthus's law, which constitutes such an important foundation of 
Darwinism, is forgotten […] From a truly Darwinist point of view the 
competitors are largely individuals of one and the same species, Amphioxus 
itself. If it lives in isolation it should multiply without hindrance in a 
geometrical progression, and this circumstance should in itself lead to 
variations” (Mechnikov, cited in Todes 1987). 
In spite of the many criticisms and deficiencies found in Darwin's work, 
Mechnikov found the concepts of natural selection and struggle for existence 
useful and pertinent and tried to purify them and eliminate their errors and 
incongruencies. Mechnikov did not consider that high reproduction and 
overpopulation were the causes of the struggle for existence. In order to 
support this argument, Mechnikov referred to Darwin's explanation for the 
stability of freshwater plants: “All fresh-water basins, taken together, make a 
small area compared with that of the sea or of the land; and, consequently, the 
competition between fresh-water productions will have been less severe than 
elsewhere; new forms will have been more slowly formed, and old forms more 
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slowly exterminated” (Darwin 1859, p. 107). Mechnikov found a contradiction 
in this explanation: “Here Malthus's law, which constitutes such an  important 
foundation of Darwinism, is forgotten: limited space should most of all strongly 
facilitate overpopulation (as we do in fact see in reality) and overpopulation 
should stimulate the formation of new characteristics and the decline of old 
species in favor of new ones. If this is not so, if competition between different 
organisms is necessary for the formation of new species, then clearly the factor 
of overpopulation falls to the background in transformism” (Mechnikov, cited 
in Todes 1989, p. 89). Conversely, Mechnikov considered that the cause of the 
struggle for existence was the satisfaction of the organisms' needs: “one can 
explain the universality of the struggle for existence without accepting the view 
that the earth is overpopulated and that struggle is always generated by the 
extreme, urgent need for a piece of bread” (Mechnikov, cited in Todes 1989, p. 
90). In consequence, conflict was inherent to nature and arised, not from a 
“disproportion between population and food supply”, but “from contradictory 
aspirations and requirements within a given population” (Todes 1989, p. 91). 
The struggle between the own and the foreign 
In 1874 Mechnikov published “General essay on the life of parasites”. In this 
paper, Mechnikov studied the relation between parasites and their hosts, as a 
model of interaction between different species (interspecific). Mechnikov 
considered that this interaction was a struggle for existence, in which not 
always the most complex organism succeeded. Consequently, natural selection 
could not explain “the progressive development of organisms” which seemed to 
depend “upon a special tendency to perfection” (Todes 1989, p. 92). 
In the late 1870s, Mechnikov changed his research interests from purely 
morphological-embryological investigations to studies in the phylogenetic 
development of the digestive system in lower organisms, with the idea of 
shedding a new light in evolution. It was in 1883 when Mechnikov made the 
major discovery of his career, the formulation of the phagocytic theory. 
According to this theory, inflammation was a struggle between the organisms' 
white cells and a parasite. In other words, Mechnikov established a link 
between digestion and defense, a connection illuminated by the concepts of 
struggle for existence and natural selection. 
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As a zoologist venturing into the domain of pathology, Mechnikov intended 
to introduce the concepts of Darwinian evolution into the processes of health 
and disease. He considered that a new branch of science was needed to be 
created for this purpose, a science he called Comparative Pathology, and which 
he considered to be a branch of zoology. This science should study the 
evolution of pathological processes from the simplest forms of life to the higher 
animals. The foundational idea from which Mechnikov built his conceptual 
framework was that an infectious disease was an interspecific struggle: “If we 
examine the organisation of an animal or a plant, we find that their most 
characteristic features are their organs of attack and defence. The carapace of 
the crayfish, the shell of molluscs and the teeth of the vertebrates, as well as 
many other organs, are so many means of protection to these animals in their 
perpetual warfare […] Now from active aggression to infection, there is but a 
short step” (Metchnikoff 1893, p. 2). Therefore, zoology should take pathology 
into consideration: “Since zoological research takes cognisance of the 
phenomena of attack and defence, it should likewise include the processes of 
infection and resistance, which are really in such close connection with the 
former. The phenomena of the active struggle among animals, however, being 
much more prominent, have attracted the attention of naturalists for years, 
whereas those of infection, which are far less on the surface, have been but 
rarely and insufficiently studied” (Metchnikoff 1893, p. 3). Thus, infection was a 
struggle between organisms that has become internal: the enemy was now 
within. In this case, the pathogen should have adaptations that enabled it to 
penetrate and remain in the host, and the host should have mechanisms that 
served to resist invasion. 
Mechnikov explicitly acknowledged that this new science was based on 
Darwin's theory: “The groundwork of such a comparative pathology was laid 
about five-and-thirty years ago. About this time, in 1857 and 1858, the theory of 
natural selection was built up on scientific foundations by Darwin and Wallace, 
the biological theory of fermentation by Pasteur, and the theory of cellular 
pathology by Virchow” (Metchnikoff 1893, p. 4). Moreover, he left no doubt 
that he considered Darwin's theory as the most fundamental theory of 
biological sciences: “The first of these theories, which now forms the basis of all 
biological research, proved the genealogical evolution of organized beings, and 
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explained the adaptation of means to an end observed in them. It 
demonstrated that only the characteristics which are advantageous to the 
organism survive in the struggle for existence, while those that are harmful to 
the individual are readily eliminated by natural selection” (Metchnikoff 1893, p. 
4). 
The biological phenomenon chosen by Mechnikov to study and advance 
with this new branch of science was inflammation, which was for him “the 
most important phenomenon in pathology”. It was already acknowledged that 
inflammation was a process in which hyperemia and exudation occurred at the 
site of lesion, and that the cells in this exudation arised from the “white 
corpuscles” of the blood. It was considered that exudation was triggered by a 
lesion on the vessels, which rendered them more permeable and allowed the 
fluid and corpuscular elements of the blood to flow through them in a passive 
manner. It was then investigated inflammation in parts of the body devoid of 
blood vessels and demonstrated that vascular disturbances were not essential 
for inflammation to take place. The discovery of karyokinesis enabled to prove 
that this was produced by division of local tissue cells. This was interpreted 
mainly as a process of reparation. Therefore, the inflammatory process was 
considered to consist of two instances: 1) inflammation, the lesion and 
disturbances produced by the irritating cause; and 2) reparation, the 
regeneration of missing tissues and formation of the scar. Thus, it did not only 
include the disorders occasioned by the foreign agent, but also the processes of 
recovery that led to its cure. There was some debate regarding if some primary 
processes of inflammation, such as cell migration to the site of infection, should 
also be considered as part of the reparatory responses triggered to reestablish 
the damage initiated by the intruder. In consideration of all the above, 
Mechnikov arrived at the conclusion that the process of inflammation was so 
complex and variable in its manifestations, that simpler experimental models 
should be developed in order to study it more properly by eliminating 
variables. In this regard, Mechnikov even considered that the term 
“inflammation” should be discarded, in view that this process was also evident 
in cold-blooded animals and therefore the word was no longer applicable in its 
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etymological sense15. Then, Mechnikov's strategy was to investigate the process 
of inflammation in lower members of the animal kingdom, including 
invertebrates, in order to trace and detect the existence of these phenomena 
characteristic of higher animals. 
The evolutionary study of inflammation starting from the lowest organisms 
up to vertebrates, led Mechnikov to propose his own theory of inflammation. 
He found that inflammation was a process found even in the lowest organisms 
and it was not a passive process provoked by a vascular lesion, but actually a 
reactive organismal response triggered by the invasion of a foreign intruder, 
that is, a defensive countermeasure in an interspecific struggle. Moreover, he 
proposed that the most fundamental factor during an inflammation was the 
digestion of the invasive agent by phagocytic cells, such as leucocytes: “the 
essential and primary element in typical inflammation consists in a reaction of 
the phagocytes against a harmful agent” (Metchnikoff 1893, p. 187). 
Subsequently, he left no doubt by affirming: “the essential phenomena of 
inflammation represent an actual struggle between the phagocytes and the 
irritant agent” (Metchnikoff 1893, p. 189). These conclusions constituted what 
he would call the phagocytic theory.  
Strangely as it may seem today, Mechnikov's theory was accused of being 
teleological and vitalistic. The debate was interesting. According to Mechnikov, 
Fränkel criticized his theory in these terms: “The phagocyte theory presupposes 
extraordinary powers on the part of the protoplasm of leucocytes, to which are 
attributed sensations, thoughts and actions, in fact a kind of psychical activity” 
(Metchnikoff 1893, p. 192). To this, Mechnikov responded: “The sensibility of 
the phagocytes is not an hypothesis which can be admitted or rejected at will, 
but an established fact, which cannot be ignored, as it is by Frankel. Whether 
they possess powers of thought and volition, as this author accuses me of 
assuming, is quite beside the question, though we are justified in considering 
that they possess a germ of these qualities and that their sensibility, like that of 
various vegetable and animal unicellular organisms represents the lowest stage 
in the long series of phenomena which culminate in the psychical activities of 
 
15 The term “inflammation” was derived from the Latin word inflammatio, which meant “inflaming”, 
“setting a fire”. 
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man” (Metchnikoff 1893, p. 192). He called the authorities of Herbert Spencer 
and George Romanes in order to assert that psychical phenomena had no 
specific quality or status, but they developed as associations of simple actions. 
He also called Darwin's theory in his defense against his critics: “This theory is 
based on the law of evolution according to which the properties that are useful 
to the organism survive while those which are harmful are eliminated by natural 
selection. Those of the lower animals which were possessed of mobile cells to 
englobe and destroy the enemy, survived, whereas others whose phagocytes did 
not exercise their function were necessarily destined to perish. In consequence 
of this natural selection the useful characteristics, including those required for 
inflammatory reaction, have been established and transmitted, and we need 
not invoke the assistance of a designed adaptation to a predestined end, as we 
should from the teleological point of view” (Metchnikoff 1893, p. 193). 
According to Mechnikov, therefore, natural selection saved him from falling 
into teleological arguments. 
From the concept of immunity to the immune self 
The introduction of the concepts of struggle for existence and natural selection 
into immunology, led to conceive this new field as the struggle against foreign 
pathogens. The almost inevitable logical consequence of this assumption was 
that it was necessary, therefore, to possess mechanisms that distinguish between 
the harmless own interior and the potentially harmful foreign exterior. This 
presupposed a sharp and exclusive separation among the different organisms, a 
presupposition that was also necessary for a process such as natural selection, in 
which the different individuals should be put one beside the other in order to 
compete for resources and prevail based on proclaimed individual superior 
qualities.  
Although the concept of immune self was going to be developed fully by 
Frank Burnet in the 1950s (Tauber, 2000), in the so-called clonal selection 
theory (CST), rudiments of this concept can be detected in Mechnikov's 
phagocytosis theory (Tauber, 2003). Indications of this concept could be 
contained in his repeated usage of the term “itself”. One example of this is the 
passage cited before: “But infection also has its counter. The attacked organism 
defends itself against the little aggressor. It protects itself by interposing a 
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resistant membrane, or it uses all the means at its disposal to destroy the 
invader” (Metchnikoff 1905, p. 545)16. 
Roberto Espósito explained that the term immunity derived from the Latin 
immunitas, and ultimately from munus, being immunitas the negation or lack of 
munus. According to Espósito, basing himself on its Latin meaning and usage, 
munus was a duty, obligation, burden or service, being therefore a term 
associated to legal and tax issues, and immunitas the exemption of that legal or 
tax duty: “The Latin dictionaries teach us that the noun immunitas, as its 
corresponding adjective immunis, is a privative, or negative word that derives its 
meaning from that what it denies, or from what it lacks, that is, the munus. If 
one examines the prevailing meaning of this latter term, one obtains by 
contrast that of immunitas: with respect to “function”, charge, obligation, duty 
(also in the sense of a gift to be restored), represented by the munus, it is called 
immune, conversely, to whom is not in charge of any obligation. The one that 
is free of onus, exonerated, “dispensed” from the payment of taxes or benefits 
to others. It is immune who owes nothing to anyone according to the double 
meaning of vacatio and excusatio: whether it is original autonomy or the waiver of 
a debt previously contracted, what counts in determining the concept is to be 
exempt from the obligation of munus, whether personal, fiscal or civil” 
(Espósito, 2009, p. 14). 
This etymological analysis could be continued and carried out further. If 
one does this, one finds that the Latin term munus derived from the Greek term 
μόνος, which meant only, unique, single. In turn, this term derived from the 
root mey-, which meant bind. Then, immune was unbound, and therefore, a 
separated, isolated, excluded individual. In this manner, the salient feature of 
this concept would be that of exclusion, rather than that of exemption. The 
model for a concept such as immunity would be that of disjoint sets, that is, sets 
with no common elements and, therefore, no intersection. If this concept is 
privative or negative is because it is the ultimate redoubt of being. The concept 
of self seems to follow naturally from the concept of immunity because it itself 
 
16 Other examples are: “the organism has elaborated means to defend itself against its aggressors” 
(Metchnikoff 1893, p. 108). 
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derives, in an initial analysis, from being apart and separate17. However, and 
again, this concept could be analyzed further.  
The root from which the term self derived, which correspondence in Greek 
is ἕ (hé), is, in fact, a reflexive pronoun. This particle was then coupled with the 
demonstrative pronoun ὅς (hós), obtaining the resulting possessive pronoun ἑός 
(heós). In this manner, an originally reflexive concept was transformed into a 
possessive one: the self was now to be interpreted as my-self. An originally 
dynamic reflexive concept was transformed, through an initial objectification 
by means of demonstration18, into an invariable and static possessive concept.  
Therefore, thinking of the self as an entity which separates us and sets us 
apart is not the only way that it could be conceived. The self could be that 
which we allow us to reflect and see ourselves reflected in others. This gives us 
the sense that we have things we share and things we have in common, that is, 
to feel empathy for others. Ultimately, our sense of identity is what allows us to 
identify ourselves with others. 
IDEOLOGY: A SCIENCE OF IDEAL VALUES 
The works of Destutt de Tracy proposed a science of material values, measured 
by its degree of utility. For this ideology, ideas were exchangeable commodities, 
and a valuable idea was a useful idea. To this ideology it should be counter-
proposed an ideology of ideal values. For this new concept of ideology, ideas 
are value-driven directed activities. All ideas presuppose and contain values 
that direct our actions and activities.  
Antecedents to this proposal could be found, for example, in the so-called 
“theory of the two sciences” of Alexander Bogdanov (Ostachuk 2015a, 2015b). 
Bogdanov proposed that science was a human endeavor driven by ideology 
and that, in this manner, every class of society would develop its own particular 
and specific scientific investigations according to their ideological background. 
For Bogdanov, “ideologies are organizing forms for the entire practice of 
society or, what is the same thing, its organizational instruments” (Bogdanov 
 
17 The etymological sequence would be: self  selbaz  selb-  swe- (separate, apart). 
18 Demonstrative pronouns are those of which we serve to show the objects indicating their situation with 
respect to a certain person. 
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1984, p. 48). He gave a big step forward with this definition. For both Destutt 
de Tracy and Bogdanov, everything was ultimately ideological, but for very 
different reasons. For Destutt de Tracy, ideas were perceptions coming from 
the senses and whose value resided in their utility, what rendered them as 
exchangeable commodities for making profit. For Bogdanov, ideas were the 
products of organized experience, that is, the result of a production 
accomplished by social cooperative and interactive work. An idea was an 
“organizational scheme, whether it comes out in the form of a technical rule, 
scientific knowledge or artistic conception”, which “coordinates the efforts of 
people in a direct and manifest fashion”, and “serves as a living means of 
rallying the collective toward a unity of perception, feeling and mood; it rears 
an individual for his life in society, prepares the organizational elements of the 
collective and introduces them into its internal order” (Bogdanov 1984, p. 3). 
For Bogdanov, ideas arised ultimately from active human social praxis, not 
from a passive individual perception from the senses.  
Bogdanov, influenced by his historical materialism, could not go much 
further. In spite of being accused of idealist by his comrades for following 
Mach's ideas, his theory for the creation of ideas remained purely materialistic: 
ideas originated from concrete, real practice19. However, he admitted that these 
materially-born ideas could then be transformed into ideals for the assembly 
and inspiration of society. A growing, striving collective contained “socially 
practical and actively organizational ideals” (Bogdanov 1984, p. 120). He even 
ventured to affirm that “the pinnacle of each ideology, its highest characteristic, 
lies in the vital ideal” (Bogdanov 1984, p. 120). 
Therefore, values are ideals that inspire our actions. They constitute an 
ideological matrix in which we are imbued and from which they exert a 
numinous power that impel us to act in a given way. In this regard, it is an 
axiological matrix20. This matrix is a plexus, a pleroma, an interwoven web 
which nodes or knots are the enfolded values, as seminal reasons, waiting to be 
developed and actualized by a subject who came under its influence and 
 
19 His materialism also led him to adopt the concepts of “struggle for existence” and “natural selection”. 
20 Axiology comes from the Greek term ἀξία, which means value. But there is more: this term, in turn, 
derives from ἄγω, which means to lead, carry with, guide. Therefore, values carry in their own term their 
capacity to induce and direct.  
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charm. Once we are captivated under the influence of an ideal value, we do 
not simply perform it or actualize it, it would be more appropriate to say that 
the value is performed and actualized through ourselves. We become the 
simple instruments or organs of its whim. In other words, ideal values are 
normative. 
The existence and factuality of this matrix can be evidenced simply by 
viewing how the world is now. By doing this, we will only see realizations and 
actualizations of values derived from materialism. We will see commodities 
loaded with an exchange or monetary label, and not only material objects but 
also immaterial ones, including knowledge. 
CONCLUSION 
In this work we have shown that Darwin read Malthus much earlier than it had 
been determined. Malthus' theory was contained and summarized in Paley's 
“Natural Theology”, which Darwin read in 1831. Moreover, we have 
demonstrated that there is a logical necessity of the concept of struggle for 
existence, for Darwin being able to develop his concept of natural selection: the 
second could not have been developed without the first one. In this manner, 
Malthus' theory was not the missing piece for Darwin's final and definite 
concrescence, but a real logical antecedent. The same applies to Mechnikov, 
who required the concepts of struggle for existence and natural selection for the 
development of his concept of immunity. 
Ultimately, it does not matter if Darwin read Malthus before or after his 
conceptual developments, if this reading was indispensable or not, etc. The 
reality is that there were various antecedents to Darwin's concept of natural 
selection. There was a growing conceptual trajectory that led to Darwin's final 
concretion. And this trajectory was guided and directed by the same values: 
individual interest, inevitable inequality, property, utility and profit. With these 
interests, it was inevitable to picture a world where the most gifted, and the 
ones who could best profit from their utilities, would survive. And all this was 
not “natural”, they were not ideas provided by the senses, they were ideas 
provided by their values. It was not just a simple (and recurrent) coincidence 
that advocators of social inequality considered it as “natural”. Their values 
determined their ideas, which, in turn, served to justify and substantiate their 
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values. But under this materialistic view, the most gifted were, in fact, the most 
learned21. Therefore, their prevalence came from their apprehension, 
appropriateness and privilege. The paradox of this proposal is that the more 
you take and own, the more idiot you become22.  
The proposal of an ideological matrix is also important for science policy 
making. It shows that there are other values that could drive science and 
stimulate other scientific endeavours. Science policy should rely not on the 
applicability of certain knowledge, but on the values that direct it. We still live 
in a society whose imbued values tell us that social inequality is natural and that 
selection is a creative process that leads to progress. The truth is that selection is 
a filtering and discarding process that sustains, accentuates and aggravates 
social inequality. Values are ideals that constitute an ideological matrix that 
exerts a numinous activity and inspire us and impulse us towards certain 
directions. 
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